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CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS AND THE “FORTY 
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 “What’s in a name?  That which we call a rose/ By any other name 
would smell as sweet.”
 
1  Whether or not one agrees with the young 
Shakespeare about names—and many decidedly do not2
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 1.  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO & JULIET THE SECOND ACT, sc.2, 43-44.   
 2.  For example, those steeped in traditional magical and alchemical lore would insist that 
words have power and that naming things or entities can have enormous significance.  See generally 
DONALD TYSON, THE POWER OF THE WORD: THE SECRET CODE OF CREATION (2004); DONALD C. 
LAYCOCK, THE COMPLETE ENOCHIAN DICTIONARY: A DICTIONARY OF THE ANGELIC LANGUAGE 
AS REVEALED TO DR. JOHN DEE AND EDWARD KELLEY (2001); ISRAEL REGARDIE, THE GOLDEN 
DAWN: THE ORIGINAL ACCOUNT OF THE TEACHINGS, RITES & CEREMONIES OF THE HERMETIC 
ORDER (6th ed. 1989).  Through the centuries, there has been much discussion in Judaeo-Christian 
theology, starting with the Tetragrammaton, about what the true name of God might be.  For some 
scholarship on the subject, see generally LESTER SUMRALL, THE NAMES OF GOD (1993); NATHAN 
STONE, NAMES OF GOD (1944). Likewise there is the ancient belief, derived possibly from 
preoccupation with what might be the true name of God and the true name of the Devil (cf. Michael 
Hornyansky, The Truth of Fables, in ONLY CONNECT: READINGS ON CHILDREN’S LITERATURE 130 
(Sheila Egoff et al. eds., 2d ed. 1980) (“There are only two beings in the universe who have secret 
names, unknown to all but the adept: one of them is God, whose holy Name must not be spoken; the 
other, over whom mortal man may gain power by pronouncing his mysterious proper name, is the 
Devil.”), that knowing someone’s name gave power over that person.  This is exemplified in 
fairytale literature (e.g., the Grimms’ Rumpelstiltskin, or the English variant Tom Tit Tot).  See 
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numerologists undoubtedly will assure you) are decidedly a different 
story and have always been thought to have extrinsic significance.   
The number forty, for example, has extensive numerological 
significance, principally (though not exclusively) in biblical texts.  A 
time period in the Bible—whether in days, months, or years and whether 
in the books of the Old or New Testament—that features the number 
forty is most often a time of trial, testing, punishment, or probation;3 
however, the number forty in scripture also symbolized periods of peace 
and reward.4
Thus one cannot help but remark at the rather prominent 
instantiation of the number forty in a Supreme Court opinion, even a 
dissent.  This occurred in the Supreme Court’s June 8, 2009 decision in 
Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co.,
  
5
 
generally JACK ZIPES, BREAKING THE MAGIC SPELL: RADICAL THEORIES OF FOLK AND FAIRY 
TALES (1979); STEVEN OLDERR, SYMBOLISM: A COMPREHENSIVE DICTIONARY (1986). 
 a case that has attracted 
 3.  There is a plethora of examples.  During the Great Flood, in Noah’s time, it rained for 
forty days and forty nights.  Genesis 7:12.  After the deluge ceased, Noah remained on the Ark for 
another forty days.  Id. 7:17.  Moses, whilst receiving the Ten Commandments, spent forty days and 
forty nights on Mount Sinai.  Exodus 34:28.  Moses was forty years old and steeped in the learning 
of Egypt when first he visited his brethren the Children of Israel.  Acts 7:23.  Afterwards, he lived in 
Midian for another forty years before an angel appeared to him in the wilderness in the flame of a 
burning bush.  Id. 7:30.  Later still, Moses spent forty days and forty nights with God and fasted 
during that time.  Exodus 34:28.  The Israelites were made to wander for forty years in the desert 
and eat manna during that period before reaching the promised land.  Numbers 14:33; Deuteronomy 
8:2.  Israel scouted out the land of Canaan for forty days.  Numbers 13:25.  A punishment of forty 
lashes was prescribed for punishing criminals.  Deuteronomy 25:3; 2 Corinthians 11:24.  Goliath 
presented himself to Israel and taunted them for forty days.  1 Samuel 17:16.  The prophet Elijah 
fasted for forty days.  1 Kings 19:8.  When he fled for his life from Queen Jezebel, Elijah travels 
forty days and forty nights to Horeb.  1 Kings 19:8.  Nineveh’s inhabitants were given forty days to 
repent before the city was punished.  Jonah 3:4.  Egypt was left desolate for forty years because of 
God’s judgments.  Ezekiel 29:12.  Jesus spent forty days in the wilderness.  Mark 1:12-13.  Jesus 
fasted forty days and forty nights and was then tempted.  Matthew 4:2.   
 4.  For example, King Solomon reigned for forty years.  2 Chronicles 9:30.  So too did Eli, 1 
Samuel 4:18, Saul, Acts 13:21, and David, 2 Samuel 5:4.  There were several forty-year periods of 
peace and prosperity for Israel under Othniel, Judges 3:11, Barak, id. 5:31, and Gideon, id. 8:28.  
Jesus was seen on Earth forty days after his resurrection.  Acts 1:3.   
 5.  129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).   
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considerable publicity and public interest.6  The dissenting opinion of 
Chief Justice Roberts prominently featured forty questions about the 
scope of, ramifications of, and limitations on the majority’s decision.7
As discussed below,
  
8 it appears that the Chief Justice had to stretch 
a bit to reach a total of forty questions.  As this impressive sum reflects 
neither a forecast of trial, testing, punishment, or probation, nor anything 
remotely partaking of peace and reward, we had to look, tongues firmly 
in cheek, farther afield for numerological significance.  What we found 
came not from scriptural accounts of the ancient Middle East but from a 
different text centered in the same region: the tales of that courageous, 
extraordinarily inventive personage, celebrated in both literature and 
music,9
 
 6.  See, e.g., ABA Now, Post-Caperton Issues Still Unfolding, as States Seek Solutions to 
“Justice for Sale” (Aug. 1, 2009), http://www.abanow.org/2009/08/post-caperton; Amanda 
Bronstad, Stage Set for Lawsuits over Judicial Recusal: Big Campaign Cash Can Compromise 
Litigants’ Due Process Rights—But What About the First Amendment?, NAT’L L.J., June 22, 2009;  
Joan C. Rogers, Draft ABA Report Reviews Rules and Processes for Judicial Recusal, Recommends 
Improvements, 77 U.S.L.W. 1782 (June 16, 2009); A Black Mark for Judicial Election, AUSTIN 
AMERICAN-STATESMAN, June 13, 2009; Bias on the Bench, TOLEDO BLADE, June 12, 2009; Nathan 
Koppel, Ruling on “Probable Bias” Spotlights Political Reality, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2009, at A5; 
John Schwartz, Uncertainty in Law Circles Over New Rules for Judges, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2009, 
at A20; Jess Bravin & Kris Maher, Justices Set New Standard for Recusals, WALL ST. J., June 9, 
2009, at A3; Adam Liptak, Justices Issue a Rule of Recusal in Cases of Judges’ Big Donors, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 9, 2009, at A1; Ben Hallman, High Court Rules Judges Who Receive “Substantial” 
Campaign Donations Must Step Aside; Will Chaos Follow?, AM. LAW. LITIG. DAILY, June 8, 2009; 
Robert Barnes, Justices Consider When a Judge Should Bow Out: Case Involves Campaign 
Contributor with Business Before Recipient’s Court, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2009, at A06; Len 
Boselovic, Supreme Court Hears W. Va. Recusal Case: Should Standard be Established for Judicial 
Campaign Contributions?, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 4, 2009, at A1; Marcia Coyle, Hot 
Recusal Case Debated: Justices will Decide What Standard Due Process Requires, NAT’L L.J., 
Mar. 2, 2009; Joan Biskupic, At the Supreme Court, a Case with the Feel of a Best Seller, U.S.A. 
TODAY, Feb. 17, 2009 at 1A; Sharon Male, Can Judges Be Bought?, PARADE, Mar. 8, 2008; Sandra 
Day O’Connor, Justice for Sale, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2007, at A25. 
 Queen Scheherazade.  These adventures are gathered in the 
collection known throughout the world as The Thousand and One 
 7.  129 S. Ct. at 2269-72 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., with Scalia, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 8.  See infra notes i-xxxix accompanying the tabular material at the end of this article. 
 9. E.g., NICOLAI RIMSKY-KORSAKOV, SCHEKEREZADA (1888); MAURICE RAVEL, 
SCHÉHÉRAZADE (1903).   
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Arabian Nights,10 the only mainstay in the Western canon that is not of 
the Western canon.11
As chronicled by Scheherazade, Ali Baba, an impecunious seller of 
wood, accidentally discovers the lair of a band of forty thieves, in which 
their ill-gotten gold and other riches are stored.
   Therein we encounter the celebrated story of Ali 
Baba and the Forty Thieves.   
12  The thieves, for their 
part, soon learn that their hideout has been compromised, and after some 
misadventure (including the murder of Ali Baba’s overly greedy brother, 
Cassim, and the undoing of some of the thieves at the hands of 
Morgiana, a clever slave girl), identify the newly prosperous Ali Baba as 
the threat to their wealth and security.13  They conceal themselves in 
large jars of oil and await the signal of their captain, disguised as a 
merchant and a guest in Ali Baba’s house, to emerge and commit the 
usual murder and mayhem and also recover their loot.14  Their nefarious 
plan is ultimately thwarted—again by the clever slave girl, who is the 
only person of courage and wit in the entire story.15
Caperton is an enormously significant step in the right direction for 
judicial independence, judicial disqualification, judicial campaign 
finance reform, and judicial ethics.  Arriving at this milestone required 
the selfless and nonpartisan labor of many people, including retired 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
 
16
 
 10. For a complete, three-volume translation issued within the past year in the U.K., see 
MALCOLM LYONS & URSULA LYONS (TRANS.), THE THOUSAND AND ONE NIGHTS (2009).   
 and countless others for whom the 
health, and indeed the survival, of an independent judiciary—the 
bulwark erected by the Founders against self-aggrandizement and abuse 
 11. For a recent appreciation, see Jamie James, Masterpiece: Old Tales that Still Seduce—
Western Culture Owes a Debt to the “Arabian Nights”, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2009, at W12.   
 12. ANDREW LANG, THE BLUE FAIRY BOOK 149 (2008 reprint ed.) available at 
http://www.pitt.edu/~dash/alibaba.html. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id.  To see how the plan was thwarted, and for the other details of the story, see Andrew 
Lang’s classic version in THE BLUE FAIRY BOOK.  Id.   
 16. See, e.g., Sandra Day O’Connor, Fair and Independent Courts, DAEDALUS, Fall 2008, at 
8; Sandra Day O’Connor, Justice for Sale, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2007, at A25.   
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of power by the political branches17—is of paramount importance to the 
welfare of our democracy.  That health, and that survival, are being 
challenged by the diminution in public trust and confidence in the 
judiciary,18 particularly at the state level.  That diminution, in turn, is 
occasioned in no small part by the excesses of judicial election 
campaigns in recent years.19
Our courts are not simply just another policymaking branch of 
government but perform the indispensable duty of assuring the rule of 
law.  Protecting the decisional independence of the judiciary from undue 
   
 
 17. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 433-34, 437-39 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., rev. Charles R. Kesler, 1999), NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., rev. 
Charles R. Kesler, 1999), at 451-52.   
 18. Public trust in our court system is of preeminent concern.  See generally HOWARD JAMES, 
CRISIS IN THE COURTS (1967); HERBERT JACOB, JUSTICE IN AMERICA (1972).  “[T]he judiciary is, 
in at least in some measure, dependent on the public’s fundamental acceptance of its legitimacy.”  
Stephen Breyer, Serving America’s Best Interests, DAEDALUS, Fall 2008, at 139.  As a recent ABA 
Report succinctly put it, “public confidence in our judicial system is an end in itself.”  AMERICAN 
BAR ASSOCIATION, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY 
JUDICIARY 10 (2003).  See also BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112 
(1921).   
 19. See, e.g., Harold See, Judicial Elections and Decisional Independence, 61 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 141 (1998).  See also Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges’ Campaign Financing, 
2 J.L. & POL. 57, 90 (1985).  For polling data, see infra note 25.   
    As this article was being finalized, the Supreme Court handed down its long-anticipated 
decision in Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).  There the Court held that statutory 
limitations on independent campaign expenditures by corporations and labor unions violated the 
First Amendment.  Id. at 913.  (The case involved restrictions on the dissemination and showing of 
a documentary entitled “Hillary: The Movie.”)  Id. at 887.  Consequently, corporations and labor 
unions will be able to make unlimited expenditures in judicial elections as well.  See id. at 968 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  Although discussion of Citizens United is outside the scope of this article, 
the possibility that a vast influx of additional campaign money might enter the arena of judicial 
elections – which already in the past decade has been saturated with unprecedented campaign 
support, virulent attack ads, and concomitant diminution in public respect for state judiciaries – 
makes tighter controls over disqualification imperative in cases where parties have provided 
significant financial support.  At a minimum, judges will need to have access to more information in 
order to be able to make appropriate disclosures in such cases, and donors who are parties or are 
associated or affiliated with parties before the court (including counsel) must be required to make 
their own disclosures on the record.  The Judicial Disqualification Project being conducted by the 
ABA Standing Committee on Judicial Independence [hereinafter the “JDP”] will endeavor to 
address these issues.   
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influence of special interests and interest groups is thus of central 
importance to the concept of due process of law.20  The signal 
achievement of the Caperton majority was the application of due process 
considerations to the fallout of judicial campaign finance.21  Judges and 
contributors alike are now aware that saying “Open Sesame” to the 
overflowing coffers of corporate campaign expenditures can have 
consequences with a constitutional dimension.22
Like the forty thieves who lay in wait in the oil jars, however, the 
forty questions in the Chief Justice’s dissent lurk in the shadows, 
threaten the vitality of the decision by encouraging second-guessing of 
its rationale, and possibly lay the groundwork for eventual 
reconsideration or overruling.
   
23
SYNOPSIS OF THE CAPERTON CASE 
  In saying this, we ascribe no impure 
motives to the Chief Justice, who, along with the other dissenters, 
harbors genuine misgivings about the wisdom of this extension of the 
Court’s due process jurisprudence.  The validity of his forty questions 
and their ability to withstand analysis are fair game, however.  If we, like 
Morgiana of old, can subdue a significant number of these “forty 
thieves” and diminish the puissance created by their formidable 
cumulative number alone, then the threat to the continued vitality of the 
Caperton decision can be abated and, with a little luck, all can live 
happily ever after.   
Both the majority and the dissenters in Caperton earnestly grappled 
with questions about the impact of applying the due process clause of the 
 
 20. Supra n. 18. 
 21. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2256-57 (2009). 
 22. Supra n. 6. 
 23. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2272-73.  The overruling of United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 
435 (1989) eight years later by Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997), which the Chief 
Justice discusses at some length, must be especially vivid for him, as early in his career he was 
appointed by former Chief Justice Rehnquist (for whom he had clerked) to file a brief amicus curiae 
in Halper in support of the judgment below and argue the case.  Against all odds, he won it 
spectacularly (9-0 in favor of Halper).   
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Fourteenth Amendment to judicial disqualification motions predicated 
upon a litigant’s large amount of monetary support for the election 
campaign of a judge hearing the case.  Specifically, the case concerned a 
West Virginia high court judge who twice denied a motion to disqualify 
him from sitting on a case in which the Chairman and CEO of one of the 
parties had donated more than $3 million to get the judge elected.24  In 
the face of well-documented public mistrust of judges continuing to sit 
and hear cases in such circumstances,25
 
 24. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257-59. 
 as part of more widespread 
 25. Judicial elections are no longer “low key affairs, conducted with civility and dignity,” 
Richard Briffault, Public Funds and the Regulation of Judicial Campaigns, 35 IND. L. REV. 819, 
819 (2002), but involve highly reported, politicized campaigns marked by million-dollar budgets 
and heated competition.  A substantial majority of the public—often 80 percent or higher—believes 
that monetary campaign support influence judicial decisions, according to a variety of surveys 
conducted at both the national and state levels.  MICHAEL HENNESSY & BRUCE HARDY, THE 
ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY CENTER OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, PUBLIC 
UNDERSTANDING OF AND SUPPORT FOR THE COURT: JUDICIAL SURVEY RESULTS 2 (2007), 
available at 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/Judiciary/documents/finalversionJUDICIALFINDINGSoct1707.pd
f (“69% [of the public] thinks that raising money for elections affects a judge’s rulings to a 
moderate or great extent . . . .”); CHRISTIAN W. PECK, ZOGBY INTERNATIONAL, ATTITUDES AND 
VIEWS OF AMERICAN BUSINESS LEADERS ON STATE JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO JUDGES 4 (2007), available at 
http://www.ced.org/images/content/events/judicial/zogby07.pdf (commissioned by The Committee 
for Economic Development) (finding that 79 percent of business executives believe “campaign 
contributions have an impact on judges’ decisions”) and more than 80 percent of African-Americans 
express this view, including 51 percent believing that judicial election contributions carry a “great 
deal” of influence; TEXAS SUPREME COURT, STATE BAR OF TEX. & TEX. OFFICE OF CT. ADMIN., 
SUMMARY REPORT: PUBLIC TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE COURTS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
IN TEXAS 6 (1998), available at 
http://www.texasbar.com/Content/ContentGroups/Publications3/Research_and_Analysis3/Statistics/
trust99.pdf (finding that 83 percent of Texans believe money has an impact on judicial decisions); 
TEXANS FOR PUBLIC JUSTICE, PAY TO PLAY: HOW BIG MONEY BUYS ACCESS TO THE TEXAS 
SUPREME COURT 1 (2001), available at 
http://www.tpj.org/docs/2001/04/reports/paytoplay/index.htm (finding that the Texas Supreme 
Court is 750 percent more likely to grant discretionary petitions for review filed by contributors of 
at least $100,000 than by non-contributors, and 1,000 percent more likely to grant them for 
contributors of $250,000 or more); LAKE SOSIN SNELL PERRY & ASSOCIATES, BANNERS FROM A 
SURVEY OF 500 REGISTERED VOTERS IN THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 5-6 (1998) (commissioned 
by The Pennsylvania Special Commission to Limit Campaign Expenditures) (finding that voters 
“overwhelmingly agree that the amount of money in elections and campaigns has caused them to 
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public concerns about the fairness and impartiality of our courts, would 
applying due process limitations allay those concerns or exacerbate 
them?   
A spirited and hard-fought case, Caperton resulted in a 5-4 
decision, holding narrowly—based on and perhaps limited to its 
“extreme facts”26 —that refusal to step down in the face of financial 
support of this magnitude in conjunction with the pendency of a case 
reasonably certain to come before the judge creates a “serious, objective 
risk of actual bias”27
The case involved an appeal from an adverse jury verdict and $50 
million punitive damage award for fraud against A.T. Massey Coal 
Company, one of the top-ten mining companies in the United States 
(“Massey”).
 that is constitutionally intolerable.   
28  The case brought by Petitioners Hugh Caperton, Harman 
Mining Corporation, and related companies,29 arose from an alleged 
course of conduct by Massey that, in other circumstances, might have 
been characterized as a conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of the 
federal antitrust laws.30
 
lose a great deal of faith in the political system”); T.C. Brown, Majority of Court Rulings Favor 
Campaign Donors, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 15, 2000, at 1A (reporting 1995 Ohio survey where 
90 percent of respondents believed campaign support influenced judicial decisions).   
  Here, however, only state causes of action were 
 26.  Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2265.   
 27. Id.   
 28.  Joan Biskupic, At the Supreme Court, a Case with the Feel of a Best Seller; Like a 
Grisham Novel, W.Va. Dispute Examines Conduct of Elected Judges, USA Today, Feb. 17, 2009, at 
1A. 
 29. To wit: Harman Development Corporation and Sovereign Coal Sales, Inc.   
 30. The following summary is derived from the factual findings in the trial court.  See 
generally Joint Appendix at 63a-65a, 490a-496a, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2252 (No. 08-22), 2008 
WL 5784213, 2008 WL 5422892 [hereinafter Joint Appendix].   Massey had been endeavoring to 
obtain the business of LTV Steel, one of the principal purchasers of coal from Harman Mining and 
Sovereign Coal.  Id. at 492a. LTV preferred the quality of Harman’s coal to Massey’s and refused to 
purchase the latter.  Id.  Massey purchased the parent of Wellmore Coal Corporation (“Wellmore”), 
which was the middleman between Harman and LTV and which had an output contract with 
Harman for its coal.  Id.  Massey’s plan was to substitute its own coal for the Harman Mine coal that 
Wellmore had been supplying to LTV.  Id.  LTV, however, refused to accept the substitution of 
Massey coal for Harman coal and severed its business relationship with Wellmore.  Id. at 492a-93a.  
Massey, as Wellmore’s new controlling shareholder, then directed Wellmore to invoke—improperly 
and without justification—the force majeure clause in its coal supply agreement with Sovereign 
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pursued, including breach of contract, tortious interference with existing 
contractual relations, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraudulent 
concealment.31  The net result was that Harman Mining was 
intentionally and fraudulently driven out of business, and the jury 
awarded damages accordingly.32
Due to the delay generated by Massey's numerous post trial 
motions (including a challenge to the accuracy of the trial transcript),
   
33 
Massey did not file a petition for review of the trial court’s August 2002 
$50 million fraud judgment in the West Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals until October 24, 2006, over four years later.34  In the interim, 
Massey’s Chairman, CEO, and President, Don L. Blankenship, alleged 
to have been the principal architect of the scheme to destroy Harman, 
spent (directly and indirectly), and apparently out of his own pocket, at 
least $3 million35
 
Coal and Harman Mining, and drastically reduced the amount of coal that Wellmore had agreed to 
purchase.  Id. at 65a-66a, 493a.  Massey foresaw that this course of conduct would put Harman and 
Sovereign out of business.  Id. at 494a.  Indeed, Massey exacerbated the situation by deliberately 
delaying Wellmore’s termination of the contract until late in the year, when it would be virtually 
impossible to find alternate buyers for the coal.  Id.   
 supporting the 2004 campaign of Brent D. Benjamin 
  Compounding this egregious conduct, Massey itself entered into negotiations to purchase 
the Harman Mine and then used the confidential information obtained during negotiations to take 
further actions—such as purchasing a narrow band of coal reserves surrounding the entire Harman 
Mine—to make the Harman Mine unattractive to others and thereby decrease its value.  Id. at 494a-
495a.   Massey then “delayed” consummation of its agreement to purchase the Harman Mine and 
ultimately walked away from the deal in a manner calculated to force Harman, bereft of any 
purchaser for either its mine or its coal, into bankruptcy.  Id. at 495a. 
 31. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257. 
 32. See id. 
 33. Joint Appendix, supra note 30, at 340a. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Some press accounts reported higher amounts for the campaign support.  See, e.g., 
Potpourri, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (W. Va.), July 7, 2008, at 4A (“Massey Energy’s president spent 
$3.5 million for “attack ads” that enabled . . . Benjamin to win a seat on the state Supreme Court . . . 
.”);  Justin D. Anderson, Court Race Ad Sparks Controversy; French Riviera Photos Resurface in 
Campaign Spot, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (W. Va.), May 5, 2008, at 1A (“[Massey CEO] 
Blankenship spent about $3.5 million for advertisements, helping to get Justice Brent Benjamin 
elected”); Dorothy Samuels, The Selling of the Judiciary: Campaign Cash “in the Courtroom,” 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2008, at A22 (reporting that Benjamin, who cast the deciding vote, “declined 
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for a seat on the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, the very 
court that would hear the appeal.36 This extraordinary sum represented 
more than two-thirds of the total money spent on Justice Benjamin’s 
campaign.37  Blankenship also wined and dined then-West Virginia 
Chief Justice Elliot E. (“Spike”) Maynard on the French Riviera and 
Monaco.38
Aided by this campaign support and the extraordinarily bitter 
“attack ad” campaign they funded, Benjamin narrowly defeated 
incumbent Justice Warren McGraw in the November 2004 election.
   
39  
After taking his seat on the state high court, Justice Benjamin denied 
(without any explanatory opinion, at least at that juncture) Petitioners’ 
motion that he recuse himself, and then proceeded to vote, along with 
Chief Justice Maynard, to overturn the verdict against Massey by a 3-2 
vote.40  The ruling was controversial and highly criticized as a distortion 
of West Virginia precedent.41  After this ruling, photographs of 
Maynard’s junket with Blankenship appeared in the newspapers, and 
Maynard belatedly recused himself from the case.42  (In the ensuing 
public firestorm Maynard lost his seat on the court when he came in 
third in the primary and thus could not stand for reelection).43
The case was reargued.  Justice Larry Starcher, one of the 
dissenters in the first decision, voluntarily recused himself from the case 
  Before 
leaving, however, Maynard participated in what has been characterized 
as an unprecedented departure from the Court’s seniority-based practice 
by choosing Benjamin as Acting Chief Justice.   
 
to recuse himself despite owing his election to the court to more than $3 million spent by Mr. 
Blankenship”).   
 36. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Anderson, supra note 35 at 1A. 
 39. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257. 
 40. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257-58. 
 41. Joint Appendix, supra note 33, at 340a; Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2008 WL 
5422892. 
 42. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2258. 
 43. Vacation Photos End Maynard’s Re-Election Bid, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (W. Va.), May 
15, 2008. 
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based on concern that the strength of his rhetoric condemning Maynard 
and Benjamin for failing to recuse themselves might cause his 
impartiality reasonably to be questioned.44   Again petitioners sought 
Benjamin’s recusal, again he denied it,45 and again the judgment against 
Massey was overturned by a 3-2 vote (with the vacancies on the court 
having been filled by Benjamin as Acting Chief Justice).46
The dissenting justices, in addition to their disagreement on the 
merits, were critical of Justice Benjamin’s failure to recuse himself and 
opined that serious federal due process issues were presented under the 
circumstances of the case but had not been addressed.
 
47
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,
   
48 though not 
before the case materials were distributed for five conferences;49
 
 44. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2258. 
 
 45. On neither occasion did Justice Benjamin give any reasons for his denial of the 
disqualification motion.  It was not until July 28, 2008, over four months after the opinion of the 
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was filed in the case, that he belatedly issued a 58-page 
opinion defending his decision.  See Caperton v. Massey, No. 33350, (W.Va. filed July 28, 2008) 
(Benjamin, Acting C.J., concurring), available at, 
http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/docs/spring08/33350c4.pdf [hereinafter Benjamin Concurring 
Opinion]. 
 46. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223 (W. Va. 2008), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 2252 
(2009).  West Virginia allows justices on the Supreme Court of Appeal to be replaced in cases 
where they are disqualified by lower court judges.  This distinguishes that Court from the U.S. 
Supreme Court, where any recusal diminishes the number of Justices sitting and voting on the case, 
as Justice Scalia explained in his denial of a motion to disqualify him from hearing a case involving 
former Vice President Cheney, who was part of a large duck-hunting party that included Scalia.  See 
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 541 U.S. 913, 915-916 (2004) (mem.) (Scalia, J.) (denying recusal 
motion).  There is, incidentally, no hint of any impropriety in Acting Chief Justice Benjamin’s 
selection of the two replacements in the Caperton case.  As a matter of fact, after rehearing, one 
voted with the majority and the other joined the dissent.   
 47. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2258-59. 
 48. 555 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 593 (2008).  Notwithstanding the rather extreme facts of the 
case, the grant of certiorari was by no means an odds-on favorite, since “most matters relating to 
judicial disqualification [do] not rise to a constitutional level.”  FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 
683, 702 (1948).  Indeed, the Court had previously denied certiorari on three previous occasions in 
cases where judges had refused to recuse themselves in the face of large campaign support.  See 
Avery v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1003 
(2006); Consol. Rail Corp. v. Wightman, 715 N.E.2d 546 (Ohio 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1012 
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apparently, therefore, getting four votes to hear the case was a close call, 
though of course the inside politics will forever be cloaked in secrecy.  
The oral argument was spirited and furthered the impression that the 
case was too close to call, with both sides looking for a fifth vote.50
THE MAJORITY OPINION 
  So 
it turned out: The Court handed down a 5-4 decision with an extremely 
narrow holding. That seems entirely appropriate from a doctrinal point 
of view, particularly given the federalism concerns that lurk where, as 
here, state election procedures, the conduct of state courts, and the 
independence of state judiciaries are all implicated in a single case.   
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy,51 holds little 
more than that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
does have applicability—albeit only in extreme cases—to 
disqualification and recusal decisions by a state court judge in cases 
where a litigant has contributed very substantial sums of money in 
support of the judge’s election.52  After briefly reviewing the cramped, 
somewhat unimaginative common law approach to judicial 
disqualification,53
 
(2000); Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 994 
(1988).   
 the Court traced the evolution of its due process 
jurisprudence in two generic areas where “experience teaches that the 
 49. See Marcia Coyle, Hot Recusal Case Debated:  Justices Will Decide What Standard Due 
Process Requires, NAT’L L.J. at 1. 
 50. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 
(2009) (No. 08-22), available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-22.pdf 
 51. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2256-67. 
 52. Id. at 2265. 
 53. The common law rule, nemo iudex in causa propria sua debet esse (“no man should be a 
judge in his own cause”), has been part of Anglo-American jurisprudence since Dr. Bonham’s Case, 
8 Co. Rep. 114, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (C.P. 1610).  See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 524 (1927).  This 
maxim was discussed in THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 47 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke, ed., 1961) (“No 
man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his 
judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.”). It was not, however, broad enough to permit 
disqualification for bias or prejudice.  See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820 (1986).   
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probability of actual bias on the part of the judge . . . is too high to be 
constitutionally tolerable”54: (1) where a judge had a financial interest in 
the outcome of the case, even though less than an interest that would 
have been considered personal or direct at common law;55 and (2) where 
the judge’s interest in the case involves his adjudicating a criminal 
contempt in which the judge himself had been reviled by the defendant 
or had previously served as a “one-man grand jury” in indicting the 
defendant.56
Applying these teachings to the context of campaign support in 
judicial elections, the Court properly acknowledged that “[n]ot every 
campaign contribution by a litigant or attorney creates a probability of 
bias that requires a judge’s recusal” but equally correctly observed that 
this is “an exceptional case.”
 
57 The inquiry will perforce be fact-
sensitive and will be based on objective standards, not the judge’s 
subjective assessment of whether or not he is biased.58
“We conclude,” the Court said: 
   
 
[T]hat there is a serious risk of actual bias – based on 
objective and reasonable perceptions – when a person with a 
personal stake in a particular case had a significant and 
disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by 
 
 54. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (emphasis added).   
 55. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 524 (1927) (judge’s assessment of civil fines went into his 
pocket); Ward v. Village of Monroeville 409 U.S. 57 (1972) (mayor’s adjudication of traffic fines 
affected his salary and contributed to city finances); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) 
(administrative board of optometrists had pecuniary interest in the outcome of hearings against 
optometrists with whom they were in competition); Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 820 (high court judge voting 
for novel state cause of action against insurer had similar claim against an insurance company 
pending in lower court).    
 56. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971) (judge reviled by defendant also presided 
over his contempt trial); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) (judge who presided over a “one-
man grand jury” on contempt charges also presided over resulting contempt proceeding). 
 57. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263.   
 58. Id. 
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raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when 
the case was pending or imminent.59
 
  
The extraordinary facts of the Caperton case, which the majority 
identified as being important to their decision, included: 
• the relative size of the support “in comparison to the total amount 
of money contributed to the campaign”;60
• “the total amount spent in the election”;
 
61
• the apparent effect of the support on the outcome of the 
election;
 
62
• the temporal relationship between the support, the judge’s 
election, and the pendency of litigation before the judge that involves the 
contributor.
 and 
63
As to the first three points, the Court concluded that Blankenship’s 
direct and indirect campaign support “had a significant and 
disproportionate influence in placing Justice Benjamin on the case. . . . 
[They] eclipsed the total amount spent by all other Benjamin supporters 
and exceeded by 300% the amount spent by Benjamin's campaign 
committee.”
  
64  In the aggregate, these factors “‘offer[ed] a possible 
temptation to the average . . . judge to . . . lead him not to hold the 
balance nice, clear, and true.’”65
 
  The Court said:  
    In an election decided by fewer than 50,000 votes (382,036 to 
334,301), . . . Blankenship’s campaign contributions – in 
comparison to the total amount contributed to the campaign, as 
well as the total amount spent in the election – had a significant 
 
 59. Id. at 2263-64.   
 60. Id. at 2264.   
 61. Id. 
 62. Id.   
 63. Id.   
 64. Id.  The Court also noted Petitioners’ claim that Blankenship’s total support exceeded by 
more than $1 million the total amount of support to the campaigns of both candidates for the seat on 
the West Virginia high court.  Id. (citing Pet. Br. 28).   
 65. Id. (citing Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532).   
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and disproportionate influence on the electoral outcome.  And the 
risk that Blankenship’s influence engendered actual bias is 
sufficiently substantial that it “must be forbidden if the guarantee 
of due process is to be adequately implemented.”66
 
  
On the fourth and final point, the Court found it “reasonably 
foreseeable” that the appeal of the jury verdict would be before Justice 
Benjamin.67
 
   
   The $50 million adverse jury verdict had been entered before the 
election, and the Supreme Court of Appeals was the next step 
once the state trial court dealt with post-trial motions. So it 
became at once apparent that, absent recusal, Justice Benjamin 
would review a judgment that cost his biggest donor’s company 
$50 million. Although there is no allegation of a quid pro quo 
agreement, the fact remains that Blankenship’s extraordinary 
contributions were made at a time when he had a vested stake in 
the outcome. Just as no man is allowed to be a judge in his own 
cause, similar fears of bias can arise when—without the consent 
of the other parties—a man chooses the judge in his own cause. 
And applying this principle to the judicial election process, there 
was here a serious, objective risk of actual bias that required 
Justice Benjamin's recusal.68
 
   
Finally, the majority’s rejoinder to the dissenters’ floodgates 
argument (see below) states that the Constitution will require recusal 
only in truly extraordinary situations, that the Caperton facts comprise 
just such an extraordinary situation and are, in fact, “extreme by any 
measure,” and then goes on to observe that the Court’s previous due 
process recusal cases (to wit: Lavoie, Mayberry, Monroeville, and 
Murchison) did not lead to a torrent of due process-based 
 
 66. Id. (quoting Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47) (citation omitted).   
 67. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2264-65. 
 68. Id. at 2265 (emphasis added).   
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disqualification motions.69  Furthermore, the Court noted the importance 
of ongoing judicial reform efforts by the American Bar Association and 
the states to “eliminate even the appearance of partiality.”70
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS’S DISSENT
  
71
The dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Roberts is remarkable for 
its enumeration of forty questions that he believes are raised by the 
absence from the majority opinion of any standard for adumbrating the 
“probability of bias” test.
   
72  In essence, the dissenters’ fear that the 
Court’s decision will open the floodgates for due process-based 
disqualification motions, most of them frivolous, that will inundate the 
courts and perversely undermine that public confidence that the majority 
opinion seeks to promote.73
The forty questions themselves are somewhat disjointed, and a few 
of them seem little more than filler.  Nonetheless, the cumulative effect 
of such an enumeration creates a strong impression that much about the 
due process implications of judicial disqualification remains to be 
discussed and debated and casts doubt on the wisdom of applying those 
   
 
 69. Id. at 2265-66.   
 70. Id. at 2266 (citing MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT  Canon 2 (2004) (sometimes 
hereinafter referred to as the “Model Code”); Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Petitioners (merits stage) 14 & n.29, Caperton v. Massey, 129 S. Ct. 2252 
(2009) (No. 08-22), 2009 WL 45978).   
 71. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267-74.  Justice Scalia also filed a brief dissenting opinion, 
criticizing the majority’s opinion as reinforcing the public perception that he deems most 
corrosive—at least in the thirty-nine states that have some form of judicial elections—to public 
confidence in the judicial system, i.e., that “litigation is just a game, that the party with the most 
resourceful lawyer can play it to win, [and] that our seemingly interminable legal proceedings are 
wonderfully self-perpetuating but incapable of delivering real-world justice.”  Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 
at 2274 (Scalia, J.)  Justice Scalia amplified on this with a quote from the Talmud, leading one 
online journalist to quip, “Scalia is clearly teaching Bar Mitzvah classes somewhere this year.”  
Dahlia Lithwick, The Great Caperton Caper: The Supreme Court Talks About Judicial Bias.  
Kinda., SLATE, June 8, 2009, available at http://www.slate.com/id/2220031/pagenum/all. 
 72. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2269. 
 73. See. id. at 2272.  In that regard, the dissent appears overblown.  How many times, after all, 
did Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, use for describing the facts of this case such 
adjectives as “extreme” or “extraordinary”? 
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principles to monetary support for judicial election campaigns.74
For the sake of facilitating that discussion and debate, we have 
rearranged the forty questions below into six broad categories presented 
in a two-column tabular format.  The categories are (1) Support Levels, 
(2) What Campaign Support Counts?, (3) Characteristics of the Case, (4) 
Characteristics of the Judge, (5) Characteristics of the Decision, and (6) 
Procedural Issues.  The questions themselves have sometimes been 
paraphrased to make them more concise or more accurate.
  Even 
less than a full forty would have served the same purpose, since in our 
view, any number of questions in excess of twenty would be sufficiently 
ample to generate the same reaction.   
75
 
 Many of the 
questions seem to have, at least to us, readily apparent answers; others 
are more thought-provoking and admit of no ready answers.  Our 
commentary on (and, where appropriate, suggested answers to) most of 
the individual questions may be found in the endnotes following the 
table.  To some of the questions we have appended no commentary, but 
nothing of substantive import should be inferred from the absence of 
comment to any particular question.   
 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS’ FORTY QUESTIONS IN CAPERTON v. MASSEY 
 
I.    Support Levels 
 
IV. Characteristics of the Judge 
 
 74. Id. at 2269-72. 
 75. The number appearing beside each item in the text corresponds to the numbering of the 
questions in Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion in Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2269-72 (Roberts, 
C.J.., with Scalia, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).  The categories and decisions as to 
categorization are the authors’.  The annotations appear as endnotes (using roman numerals) that 
follow the table below, but their numerical order moves from left to right across both tabular 
columns rather than downward chronologically in each column.   
 
1.  How much is “too much” such that it 
gives rise to a “probability of bias”?i
 
 
6.  Does it make a difference if the judge sits 
on a trial court, intermediate appellate court, or 
80 STRICT SCRUTINY  
Keith R. Fisher & Konstantina Vagenas, Chief Justice Roberts and the 
“Forty Thieves,” 1 AKRON STRICT SCRUTINY 63 (2010), 
http://strictscrutiny.akronlawreview.com/files/2010/04/chief-justice-
roberts-and-the-forty-thieves.pdf. 
state high court?ii
 
 
2.  What it the meaning of 
“disproportionate”?iii
 
 
17.  What if the judge disclaims the 
support?iv
 
 
4.  Does it matter whether the litigant has 
supported other candidates or donated large 
amounts of support in connection with other 
elections?v
 
 
21.  Does a close personal friendship 
between a judge and a party or lawyer give rise to 
a “probability of bias”?vi
 
   
23.  Does what is unconstitutional vary from 
State to State?  What if particular States have a 
history of expensive judicial elections?vii
 
 
26.  Is the due process analysis less probing 
for a victorious incumbent, who typically has an 
advantage in elections?viii
 
 
25. What about the causal link between the 
amount of support and the judge’s victory in the 
election?  Did the judge win in a landslide?ix  
What if the victory is attributable to the 
opponent’s mistakes?x
 
 
30.  Does it make a difference if it is a 
retention election or a nonpartisan election?xi
 
   
II.    Which Campaign Support Counts? 
 
V. Characteristics of the Decision 
 
3.  Independent, non-coordinated vs. direct 
support?  Indirect donations to outside groups that 
support a candidate?xii
 
 
13.  Must the judge’s vote (on the merits)xiii 
be outcome-determinative?xiv
 
  
8.  Disproportionately large support by trade 
union, industry association, plaintiffs’ bar, etc.?  
Recusal in all cases affecting association’s 
interests?  Member’s?xv  Depend on how much 
the litigant contributed to the association?xvi
 
 
14.  Does it make a difference whether the 
decision is clearly correct/incorrect on the 
merits?xvii
 
  
 
 
10. Candidate draws “disproportionate” 
support from a particular racial, religious, or other 
 
15.  Does it make a difference if the judge’s 
decision on the merits is affirmed by an appellate 
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group and case involves an issue of importance to 
that group?xviii 
court with no “debt of gratitude” to the 
supporter?xix
 
  
20.  Does a “debt of gratitude” for 
endorsements by newspapers, interest groups, 
politicians, or celebrities also give rise to a 
constitutionally unacceptable probability of bias?  
How to measure whether such support is 
“disproportionate”?xx
 
 
19.  Does it make a difference if the judge’s 
denial of a disqualification motion is subject to 
independent review, e.g., by a panel of other 
judges?xxi
 
 
 
22.  Does it make a difference whether 
campaign support comes from the party or the 
party’s attorney?  If the latter, must the judge 
recuse in every case involving that attorney?xxii
 
 
24.  Under the majority’s “objective test,” do 
we analyze the due process issue through the lens 
of a reasonable person, a reasonable lawyer, or a 
reasonable judge?xxiii  
 
 
11.  What if a supporter is not a party but his 
interests will be affected by the decision?xxiv
 
   
27.  Finality of pending case—recusal 
required only if the issue is ultimate liability?  
What if the issue is only class certification?xxv
 
 
12. What if a case involves a regulatory issue 
of importance to a supporter not a party before the 
court?xxvi
 
 
VI. Procedural Issues 
 
18.  Does it make a difference if, instead of 
support, the litigant spent money to oppose the 
judge’s candidacy?xxvii 
 
33.  Are Caperton claims raisable only on 
direct review?  In an action in federal district 
court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of 
civil rights under color of state law?  If the latter, 
who would be the defendant(s)?xxviii 
 
29.  Are there any imputation rules, e.g., 
campaign support from a corporation imputed to 
its executives, or vice-versa, or by one family 
member to other family members?xxix
 
   
34.  What about issues of repose?  Is 
collateral relief available in federal court under § 
1983?  What statute of limitations should apply? 
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31.  Does monetary support to fund or 
promote voter registration count? 
35.  What is the appropriate remedy?  Vacate 
lower court decision in its entirety?  Retain any of 
it?xxx
 
 
32.  Does it make a difference if it is a 
primary or a general election?  If the campaign 
support was given to a different candidate in the 
primary? 
 
36.  Can the due process claim be waived if a 
litigant who knows of it waits until after the 
decision to raise it?  Or does ripeness depend 
upon the judge’s action suggesting a probability 
of bias?xxxi
 
 
III. Characteristics of the Case 
 
37.  Are parties entitled to discovery with 
respect to the judge’s disqualification 
decision?xxxii 
 
5.  Is the amount at stake relevant?  What if 
only non-monetary relief is sought?xxxiii 
 
38.  What is the standard of review?  Can it 
be harmless error?xxxiv 
 
9.  What if the case involves a social or 
ideological, rather than a financial, issue?xxxv
 
 
39.  Can the judge respond to allegations of 
bias, or must the decision be based solely on 
parties’ pleadings?xxxvi 
 
28.  Must the case be pending at the time of 
the election or reasonably certain to be 
brought?xxxvii
xxxviii
  Does it make a difference if the 
case were unanticipated?  
 
40.  If Caperton claims are settled as part of 
overall settlement, does the judge have an 
opportunity to salvage his reputation?xxxix  
 
 
NOTES FOR TABLE: 
 
 
                                                          
i.    Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2269.  This is not a question that any court can (or should) 
decide a priori.  The answer will differ from one state to the next and may depend upon 
idiosyncratic electoral circumstances.  Would $3 million, a lot of money in West Virginia, raise 
eyebrows in California or Texas?  In Alabama, for example, multi-million dollar Supreme Court 
races have become commonplace.  Cf.   Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 252-56 (2000) (taking 
into account local practice in assessing constitutionality of campaign regulation in Vermont).  
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For these very reasons the ABA, in its amicus briefs in Caperton, argued that the Court need not 
prescribe any particular dollar amount as the constitutional “floor” in order to determine, as the 
majority did, that due process concerns were raised by the extraordinary facts of the case.  See, 
e.g.,  Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners 
(certiorari stage) 14, Caperton v. Massey, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009), 2008 WL 3199726. 
ii.    Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2269.  From a due process point of view, the level at which the 
judge sits makes little difference.  The question does, however, highlight the issue whether one 
even reaches the due process issue in the first place.  Refusals to recuse by lower court judges 
can often be subject to appellate review, where a reversal would moot the constitutional 
question.  Where the recusal decision is vouchsafed to the sole discretion of a state high court 
judge, however, due process concerns are heightened.   
iii.   Id.  The short answer to this question is itself a question: How many individuals do 
you know who contribute over $3 million of their own funds—not corporate funds—to a state 
judicial election campaign?  Another short answer was offered by Justice Stevens at oral 
argument, by recalling Justice Potter Stewart’s famous definition of hard-core pornography (to 
wit: “I know it when I see it.”)  Transcript of Oral Argument 29-30, Caperton v. Massey, 129 S. 
Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22) (comment of Stevens, J.), available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-22.pdf [hereinafter 
“Argument Transcript”].   
iv.    Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2270.  This is a fascinating and difficult question.  Politics 
makes strange bedfellows and is often a seedy, if not downright ugly, process.  Surely a person 
running for judicial office might involuntarily find support from a person or organization that he 
or she finds personally repugnant or that represents a point of view with which he or she 
disagrees.  The judge could refuse the contribution, or direct his committee to return it, but what 
if, as in Caperton itself, the contribution (or a large part of it) is made to a third party to use for 
television or print media ads supporting the judge’s candidacy?  The appearance problem 
persists.  Surely the litigant seeking disqualification would argue that if, as in Caperton, the 
contribution is pivotal to getting the judge elected, the judge, notwithstanding the disclaimer, 
would nevertheless feel a “debt of gratitude” to the contributor.  Yet to rule automatically 
against the judge opens the door to strategic contributions by interest groups (including possibly 
lawyers or groups of lawyers) who do not, in fact, support the judge but who are hedging against 
the possibility of his victory and creating for themselves a paper record that would support 
future disqualification motions.  This specter of abusive “Caperton motions” haunts the decision 
and underlies many of the dissenters’ concerns.  See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2272. 
v.    Id. at 2269.  We must assume, for present purposes, that when the Chief Justice used 
the word “large” he meant both (A) an order of magnitude of constitutional moment and (B) a 
sum that would be “disproportionate” within the purview of the majority opinion.  See id.  Our 
answer to this question is a resounding “No.”  The public has become accustomed to seeing 
“large” contributors to elections in the two political branches receive some kind of quid pro quo, 
e.g., a cabinet position, an ambassadorship, in the case of the President of the United States 
(recall Pamela Harriman’s appointment by President Clinton as Ambassador to France), or some 
kind of legislative reward in the case of members of Congress.  Likewise, governors and state 
legislatures are capable of distributing the spoils of victory as largesse to their most significant 
supporters.  Public expectations for the judicial branch are quite different and demand both the 
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reality and the appearance of fairness and impartiality.  Thus the spectacle of large expenditures 
to support judicial election campaigns creates the specter of partiality and impropriety that is 
profoundly injurious to public perception of the judiciary.  That is true regardless of whether the 
source is one who makes only one such expenditure or many.  Indeed, a multiplicity of such 
expenditures would only enhance the perception that the person making them believes that 
judges can be bought.   
vi.   Id. at 2270.  This is a nagging question that long antedates the Caperton decision.  As 
one of the authors noted in an article several years ago, former Canon 3E (now recast as Rule 
2.11 in the current version) of the Model Code provides: “A judge shall disqualify himself or 
herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”  The 
Rule then lists some specific instances where recusal or disqualification is mandated, i.e., 
whenever: 
(1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a 
party’s lawyer, or personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the 
proceeding; 
(2) The judge knows that the judge, the judge’s spouse or domestic 
partner, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or 
the spouse or domestic partner of such a person is: 
(a) a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, 
general partner, managing member, or trustee of a party; 
(b) acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; 
(c) a person who has more than a de minimis interest that 
could be substantially affected by the proceeding; or 
(d) likely to be a material witness in the proceeding. 
(3) The judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge’s 
spouse,  domestic partner, parent, or child, or any other member of the judge’s family 
residing in the judge’s household, has an economic interest in the subject matter in 
controversy or in a party to the proceeding;  
. . .  
(6) The judge: 
(a) served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, 
or was associated with a lawyer who participated 
substantially as a lawyer in the matter during such 
association . . . .  
 
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, R. 2.11(A)(1)-(3), (6)(a) (2007). 
 
While the provision and the commentary explicate that this enumeration is not 
intended to be exclusive, the very specificity of the black letter language 
suggests myriad hues of gray.  For example, what if a lawyer with whom the 
judge previously practiced law represents the party now, as opposed to 
“during such association”?  What about a lawyer with whom the judge did not 
practice law but who has been a longstanding personal and professional 
friend?  What if the lawyer is the spouse of such a friend?  What if the lawyer 
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is an officer of the bar association, and has had occasion, in that capacity, to 
present awards or other honors to the judge?  The complete list of “what if” 
variations on this theme would obviously be quite long.  On the other hand, 
making allegations of negative appearances is quite easy, so evaluation of 
these situations will of necessity be quite fact-specific. 
 
Keith R. Fisher, The Higher Calling: Regulation of Lawyers Post-Enron, 37 U. MICH. J. L. 
REFORM 1017, 1118-19, n. 395 (2004).  For a general discussion, see Leslie W. Abramson, 
Appearances of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge’s Impartiality “Might Reasonably Be 
Questioned,” 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55 (2000).   
vii.  Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2270.  This seems almost a silly question, unworthy of the 
Chief Justice’s intellect.  Of course the due process line in the sand will vary from state to state.  
A contribution may be high by relative standards though not by absolute standards; thus, as we 
noted above in connection with Question 1, campaign contributions in the millions of dollars 
might be unusual in West Virginia but not in Texas, Illinois, New York, or California.  Judicial 
elections and judicial campaign contributions in the normal course do not violate due process.  
Model Code Rule 2.11(A)(4) leaves it to the individual states to determine what size “aggregate 
contributions” (both words are terms of art defined in the Model Code’s Terminology section) 
from a party or lawyer involved in a case mandates recusal of the presiding judge.  Implicit in 
the Rule is that, at some support level, fundamental fairness concerns of actual or apparent bias 
are triggered.  These are the very considerations that underlie the Due Process Clause’s 
insistence on the appearance, as well as the reality, of judicial impartiality.   
viii.   Id. at 2271.  We think not.  Money is money, and it is all about the appearance.  
Moreover, to ask this question is unduly to dismiss the majority’s point that due process analysis 
will not be the norm but the rara avis.  The decision in Caperton underscores the need for the 
states to fill this gap by statute, by adoption of Model Rule 2.11(A)(4) or some similar 
mechanism, or by some other method or combination of methods that will obviate the need for 
due process challenges.   One alternative to mandating disqualification dollar amounts for very 
large private sector contributions is to deter them by providing for public campaign financing of 
judicial elections, though this approach also must overcome First Amendment hurdles.  See, e.g., 
N. Carolina Right to Life Comm. Fund for Ind. Political Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427 
(4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Duke v. Leake, 129 S. Ct. 490 (2008).  The approach is also 
imperfect, in the sense that public finance not only may not be feasible in states like Wisconsin, 
or in the larger states, but also will not deter independent spending and may even increase it.  
(Our thanks to Roy Schotland for this observation).    
ix.   Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2271.  No causal link to a victorious outcome is necessary.  It 
suffices that the extraordinary campaign expenditures were made at all.  What gave rise to this 
question was a bit of sloppiness in the majority opinion, mistakenly identifying “the apparent 
effect [the] contribution had on the outcome of the election” as a component of the inquiry.  Id. 
at 2264.  We think this is, in fact, irrelevant to the inquiry.  Campaign support that is 
“disproportionate” in terms of the total amount received by an individual candidate and the total 
amount spent in the election will almost certainly affect the outcome of the election, but even if 
it does not, the appearance problem remains.  One could argue, for example, that the break-in at 
the Watergate building had no apparent effect on the outcome of the 1972 Presidential election, 
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since Nixon defeated McGovern by a landslide and certainly would have done so even had the 
planned espionage on the Democratic National Committee turned out to be a success rather than 
an historical debacle   Yet surely no one would argue that this lack of apparent effect on the 
electoral outcome indicates the break-in had no relevance to public perception of the candidate 
and should simply have been ignored.   
x.   Id. at 2271.  This adds nothing to the analysis.  Errare humanum est: All candidates 
make mistakes during the campaign.  Some of them are fatal to the candidacy.  Indeed, such an 
argument was made by Respondents in Caperton.  See Brief for Respondents at 5, Caperton, 
129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2009 WL 216165 (“On Labor Day 2004, Justice McGraw 
delivered a widely discussed speech in which he made a number of bizarre claims, including 
that this Court had ‘approved gay marriage’ . . . . Justice Benjamin's opponent cost himself the 
election. Justice McGraw was already a polarizing figure in West Virginia politics . . . ; his 
refusal to give interviews or debate Justice Benjamin before the election raised eyebrows . . .; 
and a bizarre speech, in which McGraw accused Benjamin of trying to ‘destroy democracy’ and 
claimed that this Court had ‘approved gay marriage,’ may well have tipped the balance.”).  
Similar arguments were raised in Justice Benjamin’s overly lengthy (and belated) concurring 
opinion seeking to justify his denial of the disqualification motion. .  See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 
2264 (quoting from Justice Benjamin’s belatedly filed concurrence).  All were rightly rejected 
by the majority. 
Whether Blankenship’s campaign contributions were a necessary and 
sufficient cause of Benjamin’s victory is not the proper inquiry.  Much like 
determining whether a judge is actually biased, proving what ultimately drives 
the electorate to choose a particular candidate is a difficult endeavor, not 
likely to lend itself to a certain conclusion.  This is particularly true where, as 
here, there is no procedure for judicial factfinding and the sole trier of fact is 
the one accused of bias. 
       Id.   
xi.   Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2271.  This seems another makeweight question.  From a due 
process vantage point, the character of the election should make little or no difference. Ask 
yourself if, on the facts about the campaign contribution in Caperton, the outcome would (or 
should) have been different had the election been partisan or had it been a retention election.   
xii.  Id. at 2269.  These are not distinctions of constitutional moment.  They all count.  
xiii. Id. at 2270.  The question makes sense only with this parenthetical gloss, which is not 
included in the original version posed by Chief Justice Roberts.  Naturally, a judge’s vote on the 
motion to disqualify will frequently be outcome determinative, unless it is subject to appeal.  
That was not the case in Caperton, as Justice Benjamin’s denial of the disqualification motion 
was not reviewable other than by the exceptional avenue of review by the U.S. Supreme Court 
on certiorari (as occurred in this remarkable case).   
xiv.   Id. at 2270.  Obviously, a trial judge’s decision on the merits—at least in a non-jury 
matter—is “outcome determinative” in a sense, though subject to appellate review.  At the other 
extreme, the decision of a high court judge sitting as part of a collegial body cannot really be 
meaningfully described as “outcome determinative.”  In Caperton, Petitioners and their allies 
argued that Justice Benjamin cast the “deciding vote,” but was that necessarily the case?  After 
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all, in a 3-2 decision, any of the three judges in the majority can be said to have cast the 
“deciding vote.”   
xv.   Id. at 2269.  This is an excellent question, extremely thought-provoking, and one that, 
unlike most of the other forty questions, was actually used by the Chief Justice during oral 
argument.  The advocates had difficulty answering this question, and so it remains one of the 
dissenters’ most legitimate concerns (and one of the small fraction of the forty thieves we find 
most difficult to subdue!).  In fact, at argument the question came up several times.  See 
Argument Transcript at 8-10, 13-15 (colloquy between Roberts, C.J. and Petitioners’ counsel); 
id. at 28-29 (colloquy between Stevens, J. and Respondents’ counsel).   
The authors believe this to be a factual matter that would be part of the total mix of factors 
to be considered in a particular disqualification setting.  At one end of the spectrum, campaign 
support from a national trade association, like the American Bankers Association or the 
Securities Industry Association, would be unlikely to create an appearance problem merely 
because an individual bank or individual securities firm was a party in litigation before the 
judge. Similarly, it would be ludicrous to suggest that a large level of support from the 
plaintiffs’ bar would mandate disqualification in every case.  Apart from the practical absurdity 
of such a result, one can point to the extraordinarily attenuated linkage between bar 
contributions and a particular law firm or member of the bar.  Most of the time, campaign 
support is “too remote and insubstantial” to create the requisite appearance problem.  Aetna Life 
Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825-26 (1986).  At the other end of the spectrum, extremely 
large campaign support from an ad hoc association of a handful of large manufacturers sharing 
common concerns about punitive damage awards in products liability cases in a particular 
jurisdiction might raise due process eyebrows.   
Here again we see the importance of the states stepping up to the regulatory plate, as a 
level of support within limits set by a state statute or rule would not likely be offensive to due 
process.  Yet, even there, the ramifications can be complex.  Suppose, for example, that every 
lawyer in a large law firm were to contribute the maximum permissible dollar amount so that, as 
a result of the firm’s size, the aggregate contribution amounted to 75 percent of a judicial 
candidate’s campaign funds.   Depending on the magnitude of total support – if, for example, 
this hypothetical 75 percent support amounted to only $10,000, it is unlikely that due process 
concerns would arise -  a due process argument might be made that that judge should be 
disqualified from hearing any cases involving that law firm.  Knowing this, and knowing 
therefore that the level of their support might be, in a sense, self-defeating, such firms would be 
careful to limit the scope of their attorneys’ support.  That seems an appropriate result.  Nothing 
is perfect, however, because the scenario just described leaves open the possibility of the law 
firm engaging in strategic behavior—making the maximum contributions to a judicial candidate 
for which it (or its clients) have great antipathy, in order to  lay the groundwork for future 
disqualification motions in the event that candidate should be successful in the election.   
 The timing of the expenditures is also relevant to the analysis.  In Caperton, for example, 
the timing was suspect.  129 S. Ct. at 2264-65.  Less compelling (witness the denial of 
certiorari), though still problematic, was an Ohio case in which two justices of the state high 
court received significant contributions from a law firm only three weeks before voting whether 
to hear a case in which the firm had a multi-million dollar contingency fee at stake.  Petition for 
a Writ of Certiorari, Consol. Rail Corp. v. Wightman, No. 99-950 (Dec. 6, 1999), cert. denied, 
FISHER 3 30 10 CHRIS HEADER.DOC 4/28/2010 3:51 PM 
88 STRICT SCRUTINY  
Keith R. Fisher & Konstantina Vagenas, Chief Justice Roberts and the 
“Forty Thieves,” 1 AKRON STRICT SCRUTINY 63 (2010), 
http://strictscrutiny.akronlawreview.com/files/2010/04/chief-justice-
roberts-and-the-forty-thieves.pdf. 
                                                                                                                                 
529 U.S. 1012 (2000).  (Notably, the Supreme Court of Ohio never even ruled on the 
disqualification motion.)  In Wightman, however, the size of the contributions amounted to less 
than 5 percent of each justice’s campaign funds, id. at 7, which underscores how extraordinary 
the facts are in Caperton, where Blankenship’s contributions amounted to approximately two-
thirds of Justice Benjamin’s campaign funds.  Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257. 
Another pertinent factor is the linkage between the supporter and the litigant.  In Caperton, 
that linkage was all too obvious: Blankenship was Chairman and CEO of Massey.  What about 
the hypothetical ad hoc manufacturers’ association mentioned above?  Is the linkage sufficient 
with only a handful of members but diminishing to insufficiency as membership increases?  
Large membership in itself is not, of course, a guarantee of attenuation, as the Chief Justice’s 
question about the United Mine Workers illustrates.  See Argument Transcript at 13-15. 
At the end of the day, however, this question, compelling and difficult though it may be, 
simply serves to underscore the simple truth that law—especially constitutional law—is not a 
science.  There is no formula that will unerringly calculate when due process of law has been 
violated, just as there is no formula for probable cause determinations under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Id. at 42-43 (colloquy between Stevens, J., and Respondents’ Counsel).   
    “[D]ue process,” unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception 
with fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances.  
Expressing as it does in its ultimate analysis respect enforced by law for 
that feeling of just treatment which has been evolved through centuries of 
Anglo-American constitutional history and civilization, “due process” 
cannot be imprisoned within the treacherous limits of any formula.  
Representing a profound attitude of fairness between man and man, and 
more particularly between the individual and government, “due process” 
is compounded of history, reason, the past course of decisions, and stout 
confidence in the strength of the democratic faith which we profess.  Due 
process is not a mechanical instrument.  It is a process.  It is a delicate 
process of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of judgment by 
those whom the Constitution entrusted   
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 149, 162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring).  (We are indebted to Roy Schotland for this quote.)  Justice Frankfurter also 
cautioned against “charg[ing] those who secured the adoption of this Amendment with 
meretricious redundancy by indifference to a phrase –‘due process of law’—which was one of 
the great instruments in the . . . arsenal of constitutional freedom. . . .”   Malinski v. NewYork, 
324 U.S. 401, 412, 414 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).     
That constitutional adjudication is often difficult is not a reason to avoid it.  As Chief 
Justice Marshall famously enjoined: “It is emphatically the province and duty” of the courts “to 
say what the law is.”  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).   
xvi.   Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2269.  Even though, as mentioned in the preceding note, law is 
not a science, it may nevertheless be possible for the states to create guidelines for this precise 
issue.  For example, one could propose a statute or rule under which campaign expenditures by 
an association would be attributed to a member only where that member is deemed to exercise a 
controlling influence over the association; controlling influence in turn could be defined as a 
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percentage of voting power (e.g., 25 percent, 10 percent) and could be defined differently in 
each state adopting such an approach.   
xvii.   Id. at 2270.  A dubious question, and one that harkens to Justice Benjamin’s belatedly 
filed, 58-page apologia.  Joint Appendix at 635a., Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2008 
WL 5422892.  Both miss the essential point.  No matter how sedulous Justice Benjamin’s 
lucubrations may have been, no matter whether the decision on the merits was right on the mark, 
nothing would shake the public perception that justice in West Virginia was for sale.   
xviii.   Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2270.  To a certain extent, this question is duplicative of what 
has already been addressed in connection with Question 8, though this focuses more squarely on 
issue advocacy and not on mere financial interest.  Supra n. xv.  In general, we believe that the 
answer depends on public perception, as approximated through the lens of that ubiquitous legal 
construct, the reasonable person.  If a reasonable person would believe that a judge could not be 
impartial on the issue in question, then the judge should be disqualified.  That is true whether the 
source of disqualification is the judge’s personal philosophy or the end result of 
“disproportionate” campaign support from a particular group.   
xix.    Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2270.  This is simply a variation on the theme of Question 14.  
Supra n. xvii.  Affirmance by an appellate court with no “debt of gratitude” merely suggests that 
the decision by the judge who was the target of a disqualification motion was correct on the 
merits.  So what?  Even a biased judge can render a correct decision.  Doing so, however, 
diminishes public confidence not only in the correctness of that particular decision but in the 
legitimacy of judicial decision making in general.  The dissent misses the essential point, as did 
Justice Benjamin.  With so many fine legal minds misunderstanding the overriding importance 
of public perceptions of fairness and impartiality to the legitimacy of the judiciary itself, it is a 
small wonder that recusal and disqualification law is in such disarray.  Hopefully, the JDP will 
provide much needed guidance to the states as they reconsider the subjects of recusal and 
disqualification in the wake of the Caperton decision.   
xx.   Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2270.  An unfortunate, somewhat sloppy aspect of the majority 
opinion is the “debt of gratitude” notion.  It sweeps so broadly as to be virtually meaningless.  
That, perhaps, is why Justice Scalia harped on it so much during oral argument.  See “Argument 
Transcript” supra note iii, at 5-7, 43-45.  In our view, the sort of support outlined in this 
question is unlikely to rise to a level that would create an appearance of partiality or unfairness 
were the judge to sit on a case involving, say, a newspaper, a politician, or a celebrity that had 
endorsed his candidacy.  It is, of course, possible, for such non-monetary support to have been 
so extreme that disqualification would be proper; the converse is equally true, where, for 
example, a newspaper or politician or celebrity extraordinarily strident in opposition to the 
judge’s candidacy ends up as a litigant before him.  As the Caperton majority recognized, the 
facts would have to be extraordinary  for a refusal to recuse to constitute a denial of due process.  
In general, we would hope that judges would have enough common sense to recuse themselves 
voluntarily even in cases that do not pose a due process threat but that threaten public 
confidence in the judiciary or fairness and objectivity. As for interest groups, that duplicates 
issues already considered in connection with Questions 8 and 10.  Supra n. xv-xvi, xviii. 
xxi.   Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2270.  A related question would be whether it matters if the 
judge’s decision on disqualification is appealable (e.g., as a collateral order) and affirmed on 
appeal.  Some of the issues raised here have already been considered in connection with 
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Questions 14 and 15.  Supra n.xvii, xix.  In the case of independent review by a panel of judges, 
a lot will depend on the standard of review.  If it is de novo, then the possibility that there could 
ever be a denial of due process approaches zero; that is not to say that another judge is incapable 
of being mistaken, merely that the process accorded – susceptible to error though it may be, as is 
all human endeavor – would be seen to be fair.  The same result would be obtained where the 
judge whose disqualification is sought simply reviews the motion for facial validity and, 
assuming it passes that low threshold, passes it on for decision by another judge in the same 
court.  If, however, the first judge’s denial of the disqualification motion is “on the merits” of 
that motion and the independent review is under a deferential standard such as “arbitrary and 
capricious” or “abuse of discretion,” then the review is largely illusory and due process concerns 
may even be heightened.  We doubt, as a practical matter, that too many judges would be 
comfortable ruling that a colleague had abused his discretion in denying a disqualification 
motion.   
In any event, in the wake of the Caperton decision, the ball is now firmly in the courts of 
the 39 states that have some form of judicial elections to implement prompt and non-illusory 
review measures so as to obviate the possibility of due process challenges.  That is obviously 
what the majority in Caperton anticipates.  129 S. Ct. at 2266-67 (discussing the ABA Model 
Code  standards for disqualification, state adoption of such rules, their importance in 
maintaining the integrity of the judiciary and the rule of law, and inviting the states to adopt 
standards more rigorous than due process requires).  Possible changes to state rules in this area 
are part of the JDP, but discussion of those topics exceeds the scope of this article.  Supra n. xix. 
xxii.  Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2270.  This is a makeweight question.  Either the expenditure 
rises to the level where it becomes a due process concern or it does not.  It makes no difference 
from a due process perspective whether the money comes from the party or from counsel.  If 
from counsel, then such an extraordinary amount of support for the judge by a repeat player may 
well demand the judge’s disqualification from any case in which that lawyer appears, unless, 
perhaps, all opposing parties are willing to waive the matter.   
xxiii.    Id. at 2270.  Too cute by half, this is another question unworthy of the Chief Justice.  
One begins to wonder whether some makeweight questions were included in order to yield the 
magic total of forty.  In any event, it is self-evident that what animates the due process concern, 
at least in part, is the problem of appearances—appearance of impartiality and appearance of 
impropriety. 
 
Almost every State – West Virginia included – has adopted the American Bar 
Association’s objective standard: “A judge shall avoid impropriety and the 
appearance of impropriety.” . . . The ABA Model Code’s test for appearance 
of impropriety is “whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a 
perception that the judge’s ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with 
integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired.” Canon 2A, Commentary; 
see also W. Va. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2A, and Commentary 
(2009) (same).   
 
Id. at 2266.  The underlying concern in each instance is the legitimacy of the judiciary in the 
eyes of the public.  See id. at 2266-67 (“The citizen’s respect for judgments depends in turn 
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upon the issuing court’s absolute probity. Judicial integrity is, in consequence, a state interest of 
the highest order.” (citing Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring))).  Even assuming the unstated premise of the question—namely that 
a reasonable person could reach a different conclusion than a reasonable lawyer or a reasonable 
judge, something the majority would be unlikely to concede—it would seem sensible to use the 
perspective of the reasonable person.   
xxiv.   Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2270.  A similar factual situation was presented in Aetna Life 
Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986), in which the Supreme Court held that participation by a 
justice of the Alabama Supreme Court in ruling on the validity of a punitive damages award 
against an insurance company violated due process when the justice was himself in other cases a 
litigant arguing that insurance companies’ failure to pay claims constituted bad faith and entitled 
the claimants to punitive damages.   
xxv.   Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2271.  If whatever the judge is called upon to decide—
whether final or interlocutory—is important enough for a litigant and counsel to risk filing a 
motion for disqualification, it is unlikely that the appearance of fairness and impartiality issue 
would be any less compelling.  Class certification, the example given in the question, is by no 
means an inconsequential decision.  Presumably, if the issue were not all that important, no 
disqualification would be sought.   
xxvi.   Id. at 2270.  This scenario is not problematic.  First, it offers no appearance of 
partiality, unfairness, or impropriety vis-a-vis any party or attorney before the court.  Second, a 
great many judicial decisions may have persuasive—and occasionally precedential—value to 
persons not before the court, some of whom may well have been substantial supporters of 
various judicial election campaigns.  Uncritically to impose some limitation—due process-based 
or otherwise—on recipients of such funds presiding over such cases would bring the judicial 
system to a grinding halt.  One would require considerably more to make a showing that 
disqualification was required, such as evidence of actual bias or prejudice by the judge for or 
against a particular interpretation of a statute or regulatory position.   
xxvii.   Id.  This question, flipping the “debt of gratitude” coin, is sometimes referred to as 
the “debt of hostility.”  Preliminarily, of course, there is the question of how the judge would 
know about campaign support for an opponent unless it had been in the form of virulent attack 
ads with attribution (e.g., “Paid for by the United Mine Workers”) or state law required 
disclosures that were made available to the candidates.  (In West Virginia, for example, 
Blankenship had to fill out a financial disclosure form on which it says: “Expenditures made to 
Support or Oppose”; Blankenship underlined the word “Support” and typed in the words “Brent 
Benjamin.”  Argument Transcript at 8; Joint App. 188a, Caperton v. Massey, 129 S. Ct. 2252 
(2009) (No. 08-22), 2008 WL 5784213).  Even if the judge does know, the amount of the 
support would have to be truly “disproportionate” in order to create an appearance problem. 
Assuming these preconditions were satisfied, then the answer to the Chief Justice’s 
question is “No.”  Conceptually, due process would logically require disqualification for 
disproportionate campaign opposition just as with disproportionate campaign support.  The 
existence of this negative corollary does not, however, undermine the ratio decidendi.   
It bears mention that if the opposition is not merely financial but is such as to create some 
direct animosity or prejudice on the part of the judge, there is precedent to suggest that 
disqualification is necessary.  See, e.g., Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971) 
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(requiring disqualification where judge reviled by defendant also presided over his contempt 
trial).  Cf.  In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) (requiring disqualification where judge who 
presided over “one man grand jury” also presided over contempt proceedings related thereto).   
xxviii   We think the prospect of federal district court review of a state judge’s denial of a 
disqualification motion is so wrong-headed and so incompatible with well-known, and 
fundamental, principles of comity, federalism, and judicial immunity from suit that the notion 
can be dismissed as not merely remote but, in effect, a red herring.   
Normally, a denial of a disqualification motion that rises to the level of a denial of due 
process should be reviewable under procedures available under the laws of the particular state.   An 
exception might be where the judge who is the target of the motion is a state high court judge and 
(as in Caperton) the high court in question does not provide for review of the denial by the other 
members of the court.  No a priori claim for injunctive or declaratory relief, much less for damages, 
would be possible, because each motion for disqualification is sui generis, based on particularized 
facts and circumstances, and there is no way to establish in advance that the motion will be denied.  
As far as claims for monetary damages are concerned, judges enjoy absolute immunity as long as 
they do no act in the clear absence of jurisdiction.   See, e.g., Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991); 
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).  This is so even where the judges’ actions are unlawful, 
in excess of their jurisdiction, or are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.  Id. at 356 
(citing Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 335, 351 (1872)).  Such judicial immunity is designed 
to allow judges to act upon their own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences 
to themselves.  Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 355 (citing Fisher, 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) at 347).   
Furthermore, using § 1983 as a substitute for appeal at the trial or intermediate appellate 
court level, would likely run afoul of various doctrines of federal judicial abstention, which would 
cause a federal court to dismiss the claim.  See, e.g., District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. 
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476, 482 (1983) (holding that federal district courts are without jurisdiction 
to review final determinations of a state high court – as distinct from, for example, state court rules, 
such as bar admission rules – which can only be reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1257); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923) (holding that where 
constitutional questions in a federal court complaint arose in state court, it was the “province and 
duty of the state courts to decide them,” that “[u]nder the legislation of Congress no court of the 
United States other than this court could entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify the [state court] 
judgment” for legal error, and that “[t]o do so would be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction 
[whereas the] jurisdiction possessed by the [federal] District Courts is strictly original.”) (citations 
omitted).  Finally, to seek review of a state lower court judge’s denial of a disqualification motion 
while state appellate avenues are open would run afoul of the abstention doctrine originally 
announced in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), pursuant to which a federal court must, in the 
interests of comity and federalism, abstain from exercising jurisdiction where doing so would 
interfere with a pending state proceeding that implicates an important state interest and in which the 
state provides an adequate forum to adjudicate the claim.    
xxix.   Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2271.  In our comments to Question 8, we suggested that states 
could enact or promulgate attribution rules in connection with corporate members of associations.  
Supra n.xv.  There is no a priori reason that rules of the sort suggested in this question could also be 
created.  Indeed, the ABA’s Model Code  already applies such an approach in Rule 2.11 in the 
disqualification context to judges themselves, sweeping into the Rule’s net “the judge’s spouse or 
domestic partner, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse 
or domestic partner of such a person . . .” MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, R. 2.11(A)(2), or, 
in another part of the rule, “the judge’s spouse, domestic partner, parent, or child, or any other 
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member of the judge’s family residing in the judge’s household . . . .”  Id. R. 2.11(A)(3).   See also 
id., Terminology (defining, inter alia, the terms “domestic partner” and “third degree of 
relationship”).  Of course, if such a rule is imposed in a particular state, then recourse to due process 
would be unnecessary.  Whether, in the absence of such a rule, due process would mandate such 
attribution, at least in the sorts of extraordinary cases where due process concerns are implicated, is 
a provocative if somewhat technical question, but not one, we submit, that suggests a compelling 
argument (floodgates or otherwise) against the application of due process principles in the campaign 
support context.   
xxx.   Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2271.  Unless there is a way to segregate parts of the decision that 
are untainted by the appearance of partiality, unfairness, or impropriety, the entire decision must be 
vacated.   
xxxi.    Id. at 2271.  To allow parties or their counsel to engage in strategic or opportunistic 
behavior does little to promote public respect for the judiciary or the judicial system. So litigants 
who sit on their rights should be estopped from raising disqualification where the basis therefore 
was known prior to the decision on the merits.   
On the other hand, using the classic definition of constitutionally cognizable waiver as the 
voluntary relinquishment of a known right or privilege, there is no reason why a claim arising from 
the rare sort of circumstances present in Caperton cannot be waived.  Indeed, the Model Code 
specifically contemplates the possibility of waiver.  See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 
2.11(C).   
xxxii      We think not.  Allowing discovery would not only be unduly disruptive but would 
also unduly prolong the case.  (Of course, since we do not believe in a separate federal court cause 
of action here, this discovery question is something of a red herring).  Litigants are entitled to have 
disqualification questions resolved promptly and meaningfully.  We believe the best practice would 
be for denials of disqualification motions, and decisions on appeal from such denials, to be in 
writing or otherwise on the record and to contain an explanation of the decision.   
xxxiii.  Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2269.  We perceive no distinction pertinent to the fundamental 
appearance problem.  Where the likelihood of bias exists, neither the size of the amount in 
controversy nor the equitable nature of the relief requested changes the analysis.   
xxxiv.   Id. at 2272.  See our observations on the standard of review in our commentary to 
Question 19.  Supra n.xxi.  As the injury for which redress is warranted is not merely to a party 
before the court but to the judicial system as a whole, harmless error analysis seems inappropriate.   
xxxv.   Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2269.  We began this article with Shakespeare’s musings on 
names in the context of a rose.  Gertrude Stein’s more modern observation is her oft-quoted 
aphorism: “A rose is a rose is a rose.”  Gertrude Stein, Sacred Emily (1913), printed in GERTRUDE 
STEIN, GEOGRAPHY AND PLAYS 187 (1922).  We essay the following homage: Impartiality is 
impartiality is impartiality, and fairness is fairness is fairness.  Lest the point be unclear, let us 
explicate our answer to this makeweight question: What matter is it if the case involve financial, 
social, or ideological issues, or any combination of these?  The appearance of impartiality and 
fairness applies with equal force in all instances.   
xxxvi.   Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2272.  Far be it from us to suggest that a judge whose 
disqualification is sought has no right to be heard in the matter.  That can certainly be part of the 
totality of facts and circumstances to be weighed in determining whether disqualification is 
warranted in the usual case or, in the “extreme” or “extraordinary” case, mandated by the due 
process clause.  Where there is an unwillingness voluntarily to recuse without explanation (which is 
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also the judge’s right and an easy way to preserve the judge’s own privacy), the most appropriate 
way for the judge to air his views is to put them on the record or to write a reasoned opinion 
justifying his decision on the disqualification motion.  Hopefully, that decision will be more on 
point than was Justice Benjamin’s—when he finally got around to issuing it.  (We intimate nothing 
judgmental when we state the simple facts: The decision of the West Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeal was rendered April 3, 2008; Benjamin’s concurring opinion was issued four months later, 
after the petition for certiorari had been filed but before the due date for Massey’s Brief in 
Opposition to the petition).  See Joint Appendix 635a, 2008 WL 5422892.  Benjamin’s opinion not 
only went out on a limb but proceeded to saw it off after him.  Therein he contended—at odds with 
traditional principles of judicial ethics found in Supreme Court precedent, decisions of myriad other 
courts, the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, and all state avatars thereof—that due process 
could never require recusal based on appearances and that only actual bias counts.  Cf. Peters v. 
Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972) (observing—even if there is no showing of actual bias in the 
tribunal—due process is denied by circumstances that create the likelihood or the appearance of 
bias.); Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968) (any tribunal 
permitted by law to try cases and controversies not only must be unbiased but also must avoid even 
the appearance of bias); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (“A judge shall act at all times 
in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the 
judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety”); R. 2.11(A) (“A judge 
shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned . . . .”).   
xxxvii.    Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2271.  Certainly, the temporal relationship between the case 
before the court and the conduct giving rise to an appearance problem is one of the important 
factors.  Due process requires an objective inquiry into whether the supporter’s influence on the 
election under all the circumstances “would offer a possible temptation to the average . . . judge to . 
. . lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.”  Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).  
That was true also in Lavoie, where an Alabama Supreme Court Justice voted to uphold a punitive 
damages award against an insurer while he was the lead plaintiff in a nearly identical lawsuit 
pending in the lower courts.  475 U.S. 813 (1986). 
In the Caperton situation, Blankenship’s campaign support, though admittedly enormous and 
“disproportionate,” became even more likely to create the appearance problem—a probability or 
likelihood of bias in the public eye—if the case were pending or about to be pending before the very 
court on which the candidate (Benjamin) sat.  The connection in Caperton was even more direct 
than a situation in which the supporter was planning to initiate litigation in the lower courts that 
might ultimately find its way up to the state high court.  As the majority held:   
We conclude that there is a serious risk of actual bias-based on objective 
and reasonable perceptions – when a person with a personal stake in a 
particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing 
the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge's election 
campaign when the case was pending or imminent. 
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263-64.  The majority went on to observe: 
    [T]he pendency of the case is also critical, for it was reasonably 
foreseeable that the pending case would be before the newly elected 
justice.  Although there is no allegation of a quid pro quo agreement, the 
FISHER 3 30 10 CHRIS HEADER.DOC 4/28/2010 3:51 PM 
 STRICT SCRUTINY  95 
Keith R. Fisher & Konstantina Vagenas, Chief Justice Roberts and the 
“Forty Thieves,” 1 AKRON STRICT SCRUTINY 63 (2010), 
http://strictscrutiny.akronlawreview.com/files/2010/04/chief-justice-
roberts-and-the-forty-thieves.pdf. 
                                                                                                                                 
fact remains that Blankenship's extraordinary contributions were made at a 
time when he had a vested stake in the outcome. Just as no man is allowed 
to be a judge in his own cause, similar fears of bias can arise when – 
without the consent of the other parties – a man chooses the judge in his 
own cause.  And applying this principle to the judicial election process, 
there was here a serious, objective risk of actual bias that required Justice 
Benjamin's recusal. 
Id. at 2264-65.   
On the other hand, if (1) at the time of the campaign support, the facts underlying the case 
have not yet arisen, (2) in the case of a lower court judge, cases are assigned by random selection, or 
(3) in the case of an appellate judge, the term of the elected judge is not sufficiently long (in West 
Virginia, state high court judges serve for a 12-year term, see W. VA. CONST., art. VIII, § 8, Cl. 
2,.but in some states it is less) that there can be any assurance that the case will come before that 
particular judge, the temporal factor may militate against the conclusion that due process requires 
disqualification.     
xxxviii.   Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2269.  It would certainly make a difference if the non-
pending case were unanticipated in the truest sense of that word.  Given the sophistication of 
strategic and long-range planning on corporate boards and committees and among senior 
management, both with and without the assistance of sophisticated lawyers, investment bankers, and 
myriad consultants, mere temporal separation would not alone suffice.  Normally, one might be 
inclined to regard litigation brought against the party who made the campaign expenditures years 
earlier as unanticipated.  That need not be so, however.  Without meaning to sound unduly 
Machiavellian or conspiracy-theory smitten, we suggest that the factual underpinnings of the 
Caperton case would not qualify, as the summary, supra note 3030, amply illustrates.  There, not 
only did Massey and Blankenship engage in a course of conduct that was certain to lead to 
litigation, they also engaged in delaying tactics over more than four years in order to put off the 
appeal date until after a more favorable jurist, Justice Brent Benjamin, was elected (with massive 
financial support from Blankenship) to the state high court.  As for litigation actually brought by the 
party who made the campaign expenditures, there would likely have to be some unexpected, 
supervening event giving rise to the need for such litigation before one could say, with any degree 
of confidence, that it was truly “unanticipated.”   
xxxix      We question the underlying presumption in this question, namely that a judge’s 
reputation will perforce be sullied by either a motion to disqualify or a petition seeking review – on 
whatever ground – of that judge’s denial of a disqualification motion.  For one thing, the motion 
may have been completely frivolous, such as a motion seeking disqualification based on the judge’s 
race, ethnicity, or religion where these have nothing to do with the issues in the case.  
Even sticking with the Chief Justice’s predicate of so-called Caperton claims, however, and 
assuming arguendo that the underlying facts go well beyond a de minimis level of support so that 
the motion is not patently frivolous, why assume that the judge’s reputation is necessarily 
besmirched?  The judge may not, after all, have previously known that his election campaign had 
received financial support from a particular party or counsel or had information about the level of 
that support.  Politics, as we have noted, makes strange bedfellows, and judges have (and under the 
First Amendment can have) no control over what individuals and entities may decide to furnish 
campaign support.  In the event a supporter is so unsavory that the judge would prefer not to have 
the support, the most that can be done is for the judge’s campaign committee to disseminate an 
advertisement of its own to disassociate the campaign from the person or entity in question.  That 
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tactic, of course, will be rarely employed, inasmuch as such advertising is not only costly but may 
well turn out counterproductive if it should end up drawing more public attention to the unsavory 
support than would otherwise have been the case.    
Indeed, now that the Court in Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010),  has recently 
unshackled independent expenditures by corporations and labor unions in general elections from 
statutory restraints (by holding such restraints violative of the First Amendment), corporations and 
labor unions will be able to make unlimited expenditures in judicial elections as well, and judges in 
the future will frequently have even less of an idea than at present whence their support has come.  
That will only attenuate further any linkage between the identity of a campaign supporter and the 
judge’s reputation. 
It is rather by stubborn insistence on presiding over a case in circumstances where, as in 
Caperton, a reasonable person cannot but perceive that the judge’s impartiality is called into 
question, that damage to the judge’s reputation can most reliably be assured.   
